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Abstract
Voice conversion (VC) aims at conversion of speaker character-
istic without altering content. Due to training data limitations
and modeling imperfections, it is difficult to achieve believable
speaker mimicry without introducing processing artifacts; per-
formance assessment of VC, therefore, usually involves both
speaker similarity and quality evaluation by a human panel.
As a time-consuming, expensive, and non-reproducible pro-
cess, it hinders rapid prototyping of new VC technology. We
address artifact assessment using an alternative, objective ap-
proach leveraging from prior work on spoofing countermea-
sures (CMs) for automatic speaker verification. Therein, CMs
are used for rejecting ‘fake’ inputs such as replayed, synthetic
or converted speech but their potential for automatic speech ar-
tifact assessment remains unknown. This study serves to fill that
gap. As a supplement to subjective results for the 2018 Voice
Conversion Challenge (VCC’18) data, we configure a standard
constant-Q cepstral coefficient CM to quantify the extent of pro-
cessing artifacts. Equal error rate (EER) of the CM, a confus-
ability index of VC samples with real human speech, serves as
our artifact measure. Two clusters of VCC’18 entries are identi-
fied: low-quality ones with detectable artifacts (low EERs), and
higher quality ones with less artifacts. None of the VCC’18 sys-
tems, however, is perfect: all EERs are< 30% (the ‘ideal’ value
would be 50%). Our preliminary findings suggest potential of
CMs outside of their original application, as a supplemental op-
timization and benchmarking tool to enhance VC technology.
1. Introduction
Voice conversion (VC) [1, 2] aims at conversion of speaker char-
acteristic without altering the speech content. Typical use of
VC technology includes applications in entertainment indus-
try, such as customizing artificial voices for audio-books and
games. In such applications, the VC samples are optimized for
human listeners. In the recent past, thanks to technological ad-
vances in both VC and automatic speaker verification (ASV)
technology, VC finds also frequent use in assessing ASV sys-
tem vulnerability against intentional circumvention (spoofing)
[3]. In this case, the VC samples are prepared for the ASV sys-
tem. In both cases, the goal is that the VC samples manage
to make the primary observer (either a human or a machine)
to believe they are observing a certain targeted speaker that is
different from the source speaker. But human perception and
machine perception are different, and in the case of ASV and
its spoofing, machine perception is more relevant.
Even if the VC technology itself has evolved steadily over
the years [4, 5, 6], the evaluation methods of VC are more varied
compared to tasks such as ASV or automatic speech recogni-
tion. The primary evaluation methods are perceptual tests since
the target of the above applications is normally human percep-
tion. In addition, log-spectral distortion and cepstral distortion
(between converted and target utterances) are also used as sup-
plementary information. At this moment, we lack of universally
adopted objective performance measures. Furthermore, there
was no standard database until recently.
Given the situation, [7] launched a Voice Conversion Chal-
lenge (VCC) series in 2016, with a follow-up in 20181 orga-
nized by the authors of this study [8]. The primary method-
ology of the evaluation of VC systems, including VCC, is a
perceptual test of various VC systems trained on a common cor-
pus. The perceptual test usually involves both speaker similarity
and quality evaluation by a human panel since it is difficult to
achieve convincing speaker transformation without introducing
processing artifacts due to training data limitations and mod-
eling imperfections. The VCC series provide results of large-
scale perceptual tests that compare many different types of VC
systems on a comparable basis. This is helpful towards un-
derstanding human perception and optimization strategies em-
ployed by listeners. On the other hand, listening test results do
not directly reflect spoofing capability and we do not know how
the results of the perceptual test are related to machine percep-
tions, that is, ASV and its spoofing.
With the above motivations in mind, the present study ac-
companies [8] that provides details of the 2018 challenge data,
analysis of the submitted systems and the perceptual results. We
provide supplemental objective quality results on the degrees
of artifacts that each of the submitted systems have. Even if
our experiments are framed to the context of the latest VCC’18
challenge, our contribution is that of a novel objective speech
artifact assessment leveraging from the rapidly emerging topic
of spoofing countermeasures. In the context of ASV, spoofing
refers to intentional circumvention of the ASV system to obtain
illegitimate access as another targeted user [9] — VC technol-
ogy being a representative example. ASV vulnerability due to
spoofing has been known for about two decades [10] but has
gained momentum only relatively recently with increased inter-
est towards ASV deployment for user authentication, as well as
1http://www.vc-challenge.org/, data available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/ds/2337 since April 10, 2018.
availability of common evaluation resources [11, 12] to enable
meaningful comparisons of different spoofing countermeasures.
There has been continued research towards generalized
spoofing countermeasures to detect spoofing attacks more accu-
rately. As a result, several advanced front-end [13, 14, 15, 16]
and machine learning [17] oriented techniques have been devel-
oped for the task of detecting the presence of a spoofing attack
in a given audio segment. The task is framed as a hypothesis
testing problem with bona fide (legitimate human speech) hy-
pothesis as the null hypothesis and spoof as an alternative hy-
pothesis. The exact definition of the latter depends on the type
of the spoofing attack (e.g. VC or replay attack).
If the detector is carefully optimized and the probability dis-
tributions of bona fide and spoof classes are sufficiently distinct,
one can detect the attacks. But if the spoofed samples resemble
too closely real human speech, the detector can mistakenly clas-
sify them as bona fide speech. Therefore, the number of errors
made by a spoofing countermeasure for a given batch of test
files is associated with how closely the spoof samples resemble
the bona fide samples. In specific, the spoofing countermea-
sure gauges the amount of speech artifacts that only the spoof
samples have (regardless whether the artifacts are audible to a
human or not) and tell us how close the spoof samples are com-
pared to the bona fide samples. Therefore we hypothesize that
this is useful for the automatic assessment of speech artifacts
produced by VC process and may be used as one of objective
performance measures. Therefore, this study compares the per-
formance of the spoofing countermeasure with subjective qual-
ity evaluation results obtained in VCC’18 and investigate how
they are related to each other.
2. Subjective quality of converted voices
Suppose we have a patch of N source speaker utterances X =
{X1, . . . ,XN} processed through S voice conversion systems
s = 1, . . . , S. We denote the utterances converted by system
s by Ys = {Ys1 , . . . ,YsN} and use Y = ∪Ss=1Ys to denote
all the N · S conversions. For the purpose of comparing the
alternative VC systems in terms of speech quality, the samples
Y are collectively listened to by a cohort of human observers,
O = {O1, . . . , OL}, each of who outputs an opinion score for a
subset of samples indexed by αi for observer i. Note that not all
the observers necessarily listen to the same utterances, nor nec-
essarily listen to even the same number of samples. The process
of obtaining the opinion score of observer i for utteranceY ∈ Y
can be thought of as evaluating an abstract, non-deterministic
and possibly time-varying, function h(Y, Oi), that models hu-
man listening mechanism of Oi. It depends on many factors
such as the listener’s life experience and concentration, the lis-
tening environment, audio equipment used, and familiarity with
the language. We do not have access to the internals of h(·, Oi)
but only its observed output, in this study the standard 5-point
rating scale ranging from 1 (lowest quality) to 5 (highest qual-
ity).
Because of random variation in the outputs, caused by dif-
ferences in h(·, Oi), one represents the results of the listening
panel in an averaged form. The well-known population sum-
mary measure, mean opinion score (MOS), is computed for sys-
tem s by MOSs = (1/Ls)
∑N
n=1
∑L
i=1 h(Ysn, Oi), where Ls
is the total number of opinion scores obtained for the samples of
system s, and where we assign a dummy value h(Y, Oi) = 0 if
listener i did not rate Y . The higher the MOS value, the higher
quality the samples of system s. The definition of ’quality’ is
also subjective. No instruction on what high-quality or low-
quality means is normally given.
3. Proposed objective artifact assessment
using spoofing countermeasures
Here we want to construct a model that automatically scores
the amount of speech artifacts. The artifacts may be audible or
non-audible2.
3.1. Obtaining machine scores
With the objective artifact estimation, the problem setup is the
same as above: givenYs, we want to obtain a single numerical
value, similar to MOS, that relates to the degree of artifacts pro-
duced by a VC system s. To this end, we replace the abstract hu-
man observer h(Y,Oi) by a machine observer, m(Y,θ), rep-
resented by some model parameters θ. There are several dif-
ferences between h and m. First, unlike h, evaluating m is
deterministic and time-invariant — in other words, it yields the
same output when repeated on sample X , and is not dependent
on the time when invoked. Second, unlike h where one usually
constrains the outputs to be quantized to a small set of ordinal
variables, we allow the domain of m to be the entire real line
R; the scale of the output value is arbitrary, but similar to h,
higher numerical values in relative terms indicate higher speech
quality as judged by the observer θ.
To flesh out the above vague idea, in this workm(·,θ) takes
the form of a likelihood ratio detector. Likelihood ratios arise
naturally from the Bayes theorem and serve as the starting point
for making statistically optimal decisions. For a given input
utterance Y ∈ Y, we compute a log-likelihood ratio (LLR)
score,
`(Y|θ) = log p(Y|H0)
p(Y|H1) = log
p(Y|θnat)
p(Y|θartif) , (1)
where θ = (θnat,θartif). The null hypothesis H0, modeled
through θnat, is that Y represents natural human speech without
artifacts. The alternative hypothesis H1, modeled using θartif,
states that Y originates from artificial speech generation (such
as voice conversion or speech synthesis). Higher numerical
values are therefore associated with speech that appears more
‘human-like’, lacking vocoding artifacts or other problems that
VC systems tend to generate.
To train θnat, we gather a large collection of natural human
utterances and train the model from the pooled data; similarly,
to train θartif, we gather a representative collection of artificial
speech samples (such as samples from several state-of-the-art
VC systems, prior to evaluating a new VC system). In this
work, we use Gaussian mixture model (GMM) to model each
hypothesis, trained through expectation-maximization (EM) al-
gorithm. Though more advanced spoofing countermeasure
backends are available, GMMs produced good results for the
ASVspoof’15 challenge consisting also of high-quality clean
samples as here, with the benefit of simplicity.
3.2. Error rate of the CM as an objective quality measure
The log-likelihood ratio in (1) outputs a number for a single
utteranceY . Now, how do we obtain a summary value for all the
samples of a given VC system s? While it might be appealing
to just average `(Yn|θ) over the samples Yn ∈ Ys, similar to
MOS, this is not recommendable. Unlike the opinion score, ` is
2Hence the aim of the measure is not to approximate the subjective
quality judgement.
unbounded and is therefore more difficult to interpret. Further,
the model θ is imperfect version of reality and cannot possibly
produce meaningful LLR scores for all human speech and all
spoofing attacks. As a result, the scale of ` is arbitrary and
dependent on the various modeling choices (including that of
feature extraction). The LLRs across databases, VC systems
and converted utterances are not in a commensurable scale. In
the nomenclature of ASV literature, we might say ` is not well-
calibrated [18].
Hence, it is better to adopt a summary measure that is more
intuitive and comparable across different evaluation environ-
ments. Our proposal is the error rate of the detector, as a mea-
sure of its ability to differentiate authentic human utterances
from those generated by voice conversion. Our philosophy is
as follows. If the samples from a VC system S1 manage to fool
a given artificial speech detector more often than samples from
another competitive VC system S2, we can say samples of S1
appear more human-like in the eyes3 of the artificial speech de-
tector. Utterances having less processing artifacts are more dif-
ficult to discriminative from human speech, giving rise to higher
error rate of the detector.
Even if our inspiration for such a proposal originates from
the work in ASV anti-spoofing, the viewpoint is now switched
from defender to attacker. In the ASV anti-spoofing, one keeps
improving spoofing countermeasures so that they are more ac-
curate in detecting advanced speech synthesis and voice conver-
sion attacks (the lower the error rate, the better). But now we
consider the anti-spoofing system to be fixed with the goal of
improving the performance of voice conversion systems — the
higher the error rate, the better.
As for the actual error rate measurement, we adopt the stan-
dard metric of equal error rate (EER) used extensively in ASV,
anti-spoofing and biometrics research. The output scores (esti-
mated LLRs) produce two different types of errors, false alarms
and misses, that are traded off with respect to each other. Here,
false alarm (false acceptance) rate (FAR) is the proportion of
artificial speech samples that the detector falsely accepted as
bona fide (human) samples. Miss (or false rejection) rate (MR),
in turn, is the proportion of falsely rejected bona fide samples.
FAR and MR are, respectively, decreasing and increasing func-
tions of a detection threshold. The EER, then, is the unique error
rate corresponding to the threshold at which FAR and MR equal
each other. As the detection task involves only two classes, the
chance level is EER of 50%. This would be our ‘ideal’ value
for a successful artifact-free VC system4. One might therefore
optionally report a scaled version 1
10
EER %, to give rise to a
continuous version of a 5-point ‘opinion score’, judged by the
machine observer.
3.3. Choice of the countermeasure model (1)
To implement the artifact LLR detector of (1), we represent
speech utterances using a sequence of short-term spectral fea-
tures, Y = {y1, . . . ,yN} with yn ∈ RD , D being the feature
dimensionality. At the training stage, we use the pooled fea-
ture vectors from each class to independently train two Gaus-
sian mixture models (GMMs), θnat and θartif, using the standard
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm. We use diagonal co-
variance matrices and consider the number of Gaussian compo-
3Or ears?
4Technically speaking it is possible to do worse than the coin-
flipping rate, for instance by swapping the two model likelihoods in (1).
EERs much larger than 50 % suggest usually an implementation bugs of
the detector, and are not interesting from the perspective of evaluation.
nents, C, as a tuning parameter. It can be used to adjust the
balance between over- and under-fitting.
Choice of the short-term feature representation is criti-
cally important in the context of spoofing countermeasures [13].
Findings from the first ASVspoof 2015 challenge [11] high-
lighted the importance of spectral and temporal details for the
task of discriminating real and spoofed speech. In specific,
conventional MFCCs, a low-resolution, low-frequency focusing
feature set that has enjoyed its de facto audio representation sta-
tus for almost 40 years, is a suboptimal choice. Discriminating
human speech from synthetic or converted speech and identify-
ing the artifacts seems to require more detailed time-frequency
representation. The winning system of the ASVspoof’15 chal-
lenge [16] used MFCCs with a combination of cochlear filter
cepstral coefficients and instantaneous frequency. Later, [14]
introduced a single feature set, constant-Q cepstral coefficients
(CQCCs), based on the constant-Q transform [19]. It lead to the
lowest reported EERs on the ASVspoof’15 corpus at the time.
Substantial follow-up work (e.g. [15]) has improved feature ex-
tractors even further. In this work we use CQCCs due to their
high reported detection accuracy, simplicity, and widespread
adoption by the research community. We use an open-source
CQCC implementation provided to the second ASVspoof chal-
lenge participants5, and similarly another public toolkit to train
the GMMs [20].
3.4. Data-related considerations to enable fair evaluation
Besides specification of the front-end features, another key con-
sideration is the choice of training and development data of the
countermeasure. Despite high accuracy of the spoofing coun-
termeasure front-ends listed above, they are notoriously sensi-
tive to training-test mismatch (cross-corpus performance) [21],
additive noise [22] and channel/bandwidth mismatch [23]. In
short, countermeasures are easy to overfit for specific data lead-
ing to potentially arbitrarily bad results for a different test data.
This makes the selection of both data, and optimization process
of the countermeasure parameters important.
As challenge organizers, our responsibility is to avoid fa-
voring any specific VC system but provide as unbiased assess-
ment of the systems as we possibly can. To this end, we aim to
optimize our countermeasure with the following requirements
in mind.
1. Stability across datasets. The countermeasure should
show stable enough results when executed on different
corpora so that one can trust the result to be less depen-
dent on the specifics of VCC’18 data.
2. Detection of state-of-the-art voice conversion. We
should aim at detecting the current state-of-the-art, or
otherwise previously known, VC attacks, with sufficient
accuracy.
3. No tweaking using participant submissions. We
should not optimize our proposed measure with feedback
of the VCC’18 evaluation entries. That is, we should not
look at the error rates and use the submitted samples to
enrich training sets. Instead, we should fix the data and
parameters to the best-known values using data that pre-
cedes VCC’18 participant entries.
The last requirement might be less obvious to the reader
from the voice conversion field. It reflects the viewpoint of
5http://www.asvspoof.org/data2017/baseline_
CM.zip
Table 1: Considered datasets for the construction of spoofing countermeasures for objective quality assessment of the VCC’18 samples.
The datasets differ in the number of speakers and diversity of spoofing attacks. The ASVspoof’15 data represented state-of-the-art of
SS and VC in 2014-2015, while VCC’16 contains more modern attacks. ASVspoof: Automatic Speaker Verification Spoofing and
Countermeasures Challenge, VCC: Voice Conversion Challenge, SS: speech synthesis, VC: voice conversion, STRAIGHT: Speech
Transformation and Representation using Adaptive Interpolation of weiGHTed spectrum, and LPC: linear predictive coding.
ASVspoof’15 train ASVspoof’15 dev ASVspoof’15 eval VCC’16 VCC’18 base
Types of attacks SS and VC SS and VC SS and VC VC VC
Waveform generation STRAIGHT, STRAIGHT STRAIGHT, diphone STRAIGHT, LPC, Waveform
MLSA concatenation Ahocoder filtering
# Spoofing attacks 5 10 10 18 1 (VCC’18 basel.)
# Spoof files 12,625 49,875 184,000 24,300 2,240
# Speakers (♂+ ♀) 25 (10 + 15) 35 (15 + 20) 46 (20 + 26) 10 (5+5) 12 (6 + 6)
# Human files 3,750 3,497 9,404 535 1,139
the spoofing countermeasure as a security gate in real-world de-
ployment: one does not know the attacks (here, voice conver-
sion samples) in advance but has to use her best knowledge to
prepare the countermeasure using attacks available beforehand.
In the standard automatic speaker verification (ASV) evalua-
tion benchmarks conducted by National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), evaluation participants are similarly
expected to process the new evaluation samples completely
blindly — they are not allowed to interact with the evaluation
samples in any manner (such as by listening to them, or using
them to do modeling decisions), for the same reason. We ap-
ply the same principle in our role as a challenge evaluator, to
give all the submitted VCC’18 systems an equal opportunity to
break down our countermeasure.
4. Experimental data
4.1. The voice conversion challenge 2018
The 2018 Voice Conversion Challenge (VCC’18) is a follow-
up to the VCC series kicked off in 2016 [7]. It features the
task of speaker identity conversion. A detailed description of
the challenge data, rules, analysis of the submitted systems and
extensive perceptual results are provided in another paper [8],
with only the key facts repeated here for completeness.
The VCC’18 challenge is designed to promote develop-
ment of both parallel and nonparallel VC methods; the par-
allel (Hub) task contains source-target training utterances with
matched speech content while in the nonparallel (Spoke) task,
the contents differ. Both tasks contain the same target speaker
data but the source speakers are different. The Hub task formed
the core (required) task for the registrants, whereas participation
to the Spoke task was optional. The participants were provided
with training and development data, and were asked to submit
their converted audio files for previously unseen source utter-
ances.
Both the VCC’16 and the VCC’18 data are based on the
DAPS (Data And Production Speech) dataset [24] including na-
tive US English speakers recording in a professional setting.
The source and the target speakers across the two challenges
are all disjoint. The number of test sentences is 35 and the par-
ticipants were asked to submit the converted voices for a total
of 16 source-target speaker pairs in both Spoke and Hub tasks.
The results were evaluated subjectively using crowd-sourcing.
A total of 267 unique crowdworkers evaluated perceptually both
naturalness and speaker similarity. The former ranged from 1
(completely unnatural) to 5 (completely natural) while a 4-point
scale was used for the latter (“Same, absolutely sure”, “Same,
not sure”, “Different, not sure”, “Different, absolutely sure”.
The trials consisted of comparisons of VC samples with either
the source speaker or the target speaker.
4.2. Data for countermeasure development
With the above considerations in mind, we involve data from
several audio collection that contain both synthetic speech and
converted voice samples. The datasets are summarized in Table
2. As for the ASVspoof 2015 collection (train, dev, eval), doc-
umented in detail in [11], we follow the protocol files provided
with the corpus6. The VCC’16 data, in turn, consists of the
samples of the first edition of the VCC series [7]. In specific, it
contains the participant submissions from 17 different systems
plus 1 baseline system, along with samples from 10 speakers
(three source males, two source males, two target females, three
target males).
The last data, denoted VCC’18 base, contains only the
VCC’18 baseline as its only attack (in specific, samples of the
VCC’18 baseline system). The human trials are the same as
those in VCC’16 augmented with two of the VCC’18 speak-
ers. Again no submitted VCC’18 system is used for training the
countermeasures.
5. Results
5.1. CQCC-GMM countermeasure optimization
Given the sampling rate mismatches across the prior corpora
(16 kHz for ASVspoof’15 and VCC’16) and the new VCC’18
data (22.05 kHz), we downsample the latter to 16 kHz. In
our first experiment, we study the performance of the CQCC-
GMM detector for different selections of training and test data,
with the primary goal being selection of our main training data.
For this first experiment, we fix the CQCC configuration to
the default setting of the ASVspoof’17 challenge baseline (29
base CQCCs plus the zeroth (energy) coefficient, with deltas
and double deltas, giving 90-dimensional features. We study
the CQCC configurations both without any feature normaliza-
tion, as well as with cepstral mean and variance normalization
(CMVN); it was included since it might be potentially helpful in
6https://datashare.is.ed.ac.uk/handle/10283/
853
Table 2: Equal error rate (EER, %) for intra-corpus
(ASVspoof’15) and cross-corpus artifact detection experi-
ments, the lower the better. Number of Gaussians 32, 29
CQCCs and energy coefficient with deltas and double deltas.
The EERs are averages of attack-specific EERs.
CQCC CQCC
Train Test (raw) (CMVN)
(i) TRAIN’15 DEV’15 0.38 1.99
(ii) TRAIN’15 EVAL’15 1.83 2.21
(iii) TRAIN’15 VCC’16 35.04 34.26
(iv) ALL’15 VCC’16 34.86 31.52
(v) VCC’16 DEV’15 26.18 33.34
(vi) VCC’16 EVAL’15 21.48 34.75
Table 3: Equal error rate (EER, %) for CQCC optimization,
the lower the better. Number of Gaussians 32, training data
VCC’16. Lines (i) to (vii) are based on 29 CQCCs without the
energy coefficient while (viii) contains the zeroth coefficient.
The EERs are averages of attack-specific EERs.
DEV’15 VCC’18 base
CQCC CQCC CQCC CQCC
Front-end (raw) (CMVN) (raw) (CMVN)
(i) stat 46.14 32.33 18.41 21.04
(ii) ∆ 12.11 31.20 24.85 21.55
(iii) ∆2 13.58 29.39 22.89 20.83
(iv) ∆, ∆2 7.73 18.93 22.08 16.94
(v) stat, ∆ 39.73 36.86 15.45 20.74
(vi) stat, ∆2 34.46 31.65 13.83 18.48
(vii) stat, ∆, ∆2 32.09 34.28 14.00 18.35
(viii) z, stat, ∆, ∆2 26.18 33.34 14.13 16.74
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Figure 1: The results on VCC’18 base data with varied com-
plexity of the GMM backend. Training data is VCC’16.
suppressing convolutive mismatch across datasets. Convolutive
bias could originate from speaker, recording media or vocoder
differences, and might be reducible through feature normaliza-
tion techniques. In our implementation, we use utterance-level
CMVN to obtain zero mean, unit variance features per file. We
do not apply speech activity detection. The number of Gaussian
components is set to 32.
The results for the ASVspoof’15 and VCC’16 data are
shown in Table 2. The first two rows correspond to the standard
protocols of the ASVspoof’15 corpus and reflect intra-corpus
performance. The results are in line with the published litera-
ture. First, the error rates are remarkably low, demonstrating
the potential of the CQCC-GMM countermeasure. Second, the
error rate of the evaluation part is higher, due to presence of one
unknown attack (S10). CMVN systematically degrades perfor-
mance.
The last four rows of Table 2 show the cross-corpus perfor-
mance. As expected, the error rates are now far higher. The
training set ALL’15 indicated in line (iv) was obtained by pool-
ing the train, dev and eval files of ASVspoof’15 into a large
training set. Comparing experiments (iii) and (iv), the larger
training gives no substantial boost for the unnormalized fea-
tures (relative decrease of 0.5% in EER) though with some im-
provement (8% relative decrease) for the normalized features.
CMVN is helpful in (iv) only. Comparing experiments (v) and
(vi) to (iii) and (iv) of the unnormalized features, the results are
not symmetric regarding the roles of training and test corpus.
Even if the VCC’16 data is much smaller than ASVspoof’15 in
terms of speaker and file count, the voice conversion samples
(attacks) are perhaps more diverse acoustically.
Based on the results of Table 2, for the remainder of the ex-
periments we fix VCC’16 as our training data. The next exper-
iment concerns the impact delta features that have been noted
accurate in detecting vocoded speech. Table 3 shows the results
for the ASVspoof’15 dev (the more difficult one from dev and
eval), and VCC’18 base. The results are shown again for raw
and CMVN-processed features.
For the ASVspoof’15 dev trials, the outstanding front-end
consists of just deltas and double deltas without feature normal-
ization. The results highlight usefulness of the dynamic fea-
tures, and unusefulness of the static coefficients — the first line
consisting of static coefficients only gives performance close
to the chance level of 50% EER. Comparing experiment (ii)
to (v), experiment (iii) to (vi) and experiment (iv) to line (vii),
inclusion of the static coefficients systematically degrades per-
formance. It is also noteworthy that while the plain delta fea-
tures are degraded by CMVN, CMVN boosts the performance
of the static coefficients in cases (i), (v) and (vi). This might be
partly explained noting that both CMVN and deltas are helping
in reducing convolutive mismatch. For the VCC’18 base re-
sults, however, we have the opposite finding: CMVN helps the
delta variants and systematically degrade the variants that in-
clude static coefficients. The globally best setups for both trial
sets are obtained without CMVN. Comparing the best configu-
rations from each trial set, 7.73% for the ASVspoof’15 dev and
13.83% for VCC’18 base, the latter appears harder. This indi-
cates that the state-of-the-art voice conversion attack (VCC’18
baseline) is challenging for the CQCC-GMM countermeasure.
In our last parameter tweaking experiment, we fine-tune
the number of Gaussians (that was 32 until now for computa-
tional reasons) using just the VCC’18 base data (training with
VCC’16). Based on the results of Table 3, we select three rep-
resentative feature set-ups, the one that produced good results
on the ASVspoof’15 dev data; the best set-up (stat + ∆2) for
the VCC’18 base data, plus the full configuration (z + stat +
∆ + ∆2). The results displayed in Fig. 1 indicate improved
performance with larger number of Gaussians as expected. The
performance might slightly be improved by increasing the num-
ber of Gaussians further; due to resource reasons, we stopped at
2048. Concerning the front-end set-up, the full configuration
containing static, delta, double delta and the zeroth coefficients
Table 4: Equal error rates (EER %) of the CQCC-GMM spoofing countermeasure of the VCC’18 entries on the Hub task. Here “B01”
denotes the VCC’18 baseline system. The two countermeasures considered use deltas and double deltas (∆ + ∆2) of 29 CQCCs, and
29 CQCCs plus zeroth coefficient along with deltas and double deltas (All feat.). Training data VCC’16, number of Gaussians 2048.
The higher the EER, the better the VC system in terms of quality (less processing artifacts). ?: information unavailable to the authors.
Waveform ∆ + ∆2 All feat. Waveform ∆ + ∆2 All feat.
Sys. generation Sys. generation
B01 Waveform filtering 18.18 13.90 N09 Ahocoder 0.84 6.34
D01 World direct wave mod. 4.87 9.07 N10 Wavenet 2.49 7.06
D02 World 27.02 31.41 N11 STRAIGHT 0.45 0.71
D03 STRAIGHT 0.97 7.24 N12 Waveform filtering 24.11 11.61
D04 World 8.44 6.73 N13 World 5.69 8.18
D05 World 2.27 7.85 N14 Waveform filtering 24.57 13.55
N03 ? 3.12 7.57 N15 World 4.26 8.39
N04 World 2.08 7.37 N16 Ahocoder 0.71 5.32
N05 SuperVP 25.74 19.63 N17 Wavenet 8.02 7.01
N06 World 1.59 36.47 N18 Griffin-Lim 17.94 10.22
N07 World 2.31 7.88 N19 World 6.48 10.56
N08 Waveform filtering 21.73 12.03 N20 World 2.02 6.82
yields the best results.
5.2. Results for the VCC’18 samples
We now fix our countermeasure parameters to compare the
VCC’18 submissions. From Table 3, we see that CMVN helps
only in 5 (out of 16) cases so we decide to not include it. Based
on Table 3, the ∆ + ∆2 is a reasonable choice of features: it
yields a clearly outstanding result on the difficult cross-corpus
experiment with ASVspoof’15 dev and, with optimized num-
ber of Gaussians (Fig. 1), works reasonable well also for the
VCC’18 base data. Additionally, we include the full feature
set-up consisting of base coefficients (including energy) with
deltas and double-deltas, as this yielded the best overall results
in the detection of the baseline samples. Based on Fig. 1, we
fix the number of Gaussians to 2048.
The results are shown in Table 4 for both of the selected
feature setups on the VCC’18 Hub task. For ease of interpre-
tation, we show the waveform generation method of each sub-
mission entry. For a case of the ∆ + ∆2 configuration, wave-
form filtering, SuperVP and Griffin-Lim based waveform gener-
ation methods were judged as VC methods that have relatively
less artifacts compared to STRAIGHT, World, and Ahocoder
vocoders. This is reasonable since they were proposed for im-
proving issues of minimum phase vocoders. One suprising re-
sult to everyone may be that althought N10 was evaluated as the
best VC by human listeners (about 4.1 MOS score), our meth-
ods detected its artifacts easily and its EER is low as 2.4 %. The
N10 does not use any deterministic vocoders as above, but, uses
µ-law quantized waveforms instead [25]. The µ-law quantiza-
tion may cause obvious artifacts (although they are non audible
to human and hence they were well evaluated by human listen-
ers).
One interesting exception to our expectations is system
D02. For the ∆ + ∆2 configuration, the VC system D02
has achieved highest EER although they have used the known
vocoder. According to the listening test [8], the D02 samples
sound very similar to source speakers and perfectly dissimilar
to target speaker. This suggests that D02 used little modifica-
tion of source speaker’s waveforms and hence has likely less
processing artifacts.
We can also see that the EERs are sensitive to the choice
of acoustic features used. Using the full feature configuration,
which was optimized to detect the VCC’18 baseline samples,
the waveform filtering, SuperVP and Griffin-Lim based wave-
form generation methods still have higher EERs, but, system
N06 has also very high EER (which, curiously, changes its rank-
ing completely). We suspect that the countermeasure that uses
full feature configuration is overfit and incapable of generaliz-
ing beyond the training data as well as the countermeasure with
the ∆ + ∆2 front-end. It would be important for us to develop
stable and robust models. Having said that, we can clearly see
that none of the VC achieves EERs close to the chance level
(50%) regardless of the selected features, indicating that all the
VC methods produced artifacts more or less and having plenty
of margin for improving the quality of the samples.
Finally, Fig. 2 displays a scatter plot of the EER of the
∆+∆2 countermeasure against the mean opinion score (MOS)
from the perceptual experiments detailed in [8]. We do not ob-
serve strong association between the two but they are comple-
mentary to each other. This is not entirely surprising remem-
bering that our objective measure focuses on audible and non-
audible artifacts, whereas listeners evaluated audible natural-
ness subjectively. As expected, human perception and machine
perception are different.
6. Conclusion
We have proposed the use of spoofing countermeasure for ob-
jective artifact assessment of converted voices as a supplement
to the VCC’18 challenge results. Our approach is reference-
free and text-independent in the sense that it does not require
access neither to the original source speaker waveform nor any
text transcripts. It assigns a single EER number to a batch of
converted speech utterances from a single VC system, and can
therefore be used in comparing different VC systems in terms
of their artifacts.
Although the tested countermeasure utilizing CQCC front-
end and GMM backend was found to be sensitive to the choices
of model parameters and acoustic features, our results indicate
clear potential of spoofing countermeasure scores as a con-
venient and complementary tool to automatically assess the
amount of audible and non-audible speech artifacts.
The obtained results are in a reasonable agreement with
types of waveform generation methods used for VC systems.
Our results indicate that the waveform filtering, SuperVP and
Griffin-Lim methods have relatively less artifacts. Since they
are not included in the current ASVspoof datasets, we claim
that it is also important to create new spoofing materials based
on the methods and to train more robust anti-spoofing counter-
measures in practice.
We also revealed that perceptually convincing VC samples
based on Wavenet [25] in the VCC’18 have detectable artifacts.
This implies that the current best VC samples may fool human
ears but not necessarily the CM systems. There is no system
that would perfectly fool both the humans and CM systems yet.
While our study serves as a proof-of-concept, we foresee
several possible future directions. Firstly, it would be interest-
ing to compare the performance to standard objective artifact
measures used in assessing speech codecs and speech enhance-
ment methods, and to other spoofing countermeasure front-
ends besides CQCCs. Some alternative features may provide
a stronger correlation to the MOS scores. Second, given the
obvious issue related to selection and enriching of the training
data with the latest VC techniques it might be relevant to con-
sider one-class approaches that require human training speech
only. Even if such approaches have had only moderate success
in anti-spoofing [26] it would be interesting to revisit them in
the context of artifact assessment.
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the horizontal axis represents equal error rate (EER, %) of spoofing countermeasure optimized to detect human and artificial speech.
Therefore, the higher the EER value, the more confused the countermeasure is in telling apart the converted samples from authentic
human speech, implying higher quality of the samples. The ‘ideal’ values would be MOS = 5.0 and EER = 50 %.
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